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FAVOURITISM OR FAIRNESS? 
 A FRAMED LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A healthy business environment coupled with fair corporate management practices are keys to 
the growth of an organization. However, we often observe that in many situations, employees are 
not evaluated under a fair assessment rule for promotion or appraisals or even for recruitment of 
a high-valued position. The emergence of preferential bias
1
 can be triggered from the fact that a 
manager and an employee share a strong social network which is extends beyond the workplace.  
This preferential bias of the manager, leading to possible inefficient decision making and 
the consequent loss in productivity of the agent has been a major area of concern in recent 
studies. But the empirical validation of the presence of organizational favouritism is limited by 
the fact that one needs the information about individual performance measurements together with 
their social tie-ups. Since it is difficult to have empirical evidences on favouritism there are not 
enough studies regarding job market favouritism. In this paper, we resort to laboratory 
experiments where we mimic a real world job market situation under which subjects were asked 
to express their decisions with respect to their personal preference or otherwise when they have 
the power of offering someone a job in his/her company. The experiment was conducted with the 
240 students of Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India through twelve sessions. This exercise 
helped us in identifying the underlying reasons behind persistence of unfair evaluation in 
organizations. 
Favouritism can sometimes be in the form of corruption, when relatives or friends are 
favoured at the cost of a third party. For example, when a public or private office is abused 
(Kaufmann 2004). However, it can be distinguished from other forms of corruption, such as 
                                                          
1 Favouritism is a form of preferential treatment towards one’s relatives, friends, or other acquaintances. These 
relations can be established by birth (like family and relatives) which is called nepotism, whereas the one which is 
established by shared experience (like school-mates, neighbours, ex-workplace colleagues)or by active social 
network building(virtual or otherwise) is identified as cronyism (Pope 2000).  It should be noted, however, that often 
in literature cronyism is largely used synonymously with favouritism, and refer to nepotism as a special form of 
cronyism related to family members (Khatri, Tsang and Begley 2006).The other form of connection is often 
established by giving small gifts and favours to influential people that may be helpful in the future (Olivier de 
Sardan 1999; Khatri, Tsang and Begley 2006).  
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bribery because it does not involve a direct exchange of material favours. Rather, favouritism 
builds a more implicit, indirect and unspecified return obligation (Khatri et al. 2006; Tanzi 
1995). Favouritism is even argued as a cancer in the organization in Alpha Review by Burke 
Group Minnesota, Inc. n a survey of Canadian government workers Comerford (2002) finds that 
favouritism is the second most important source of workplace conflict. Albright and Carr (1997) 
have listed favouritism as one of the top ten misconducts against workers. This prevalence of 
favouritism has been found both in developed and less developed countries
2
. In spite of these 
facts it persists and this gives rise to the motivation for exploring the reasons behind its 
prevalence. Though favouritism is undesirable as it generates economic inefficiency by ignoring 
the deserving persons; however in some situations it can also be efficiency enhancing, depending 
on how people respond to favouritism (Belot and van de Ven, 2011). The emerging literature on 
a positive view of favouritism tries to explain the reason for its existence and finds that directly 
favouring an agent over others (more deserving ones) can actually evolve as an optimal decision 
for the manager. Prendergast and Topel (1996), in their seminal work state that favouritism 
generates value for those who exercise it. Again, even if the manger does not enjoy any 
additional utility from favouring, the favourite may reciprocate favours by exerting more work 
effort (Kandel and Lazear, 1992, Calv_o-Armengol and Jackson, 2010). Hence, the total impact 
of favouritism on surplus can even be positive, if this value is sufficiently high. Kwon (2006) 
shows that if the cost of implementing an efficient decision is high then favouritism is an 
endogenous outcome and it rules over fairness. Favouritism can also be strategically used as a 
tool to counteract harmful impacts of collusion (Chen, 2010). It is often observed that the 
manager often restricts her choice of selection from a ‘group’ of employees with whom she has 
personal associations. This human behaviour
3
 has been widely studied in psychology and is 
                                                          
2 In african context it has been found that the privileged can gain access to resources and contracts for dominant 
tribal groups (Barr and Oduro, 2002, Fisman 2003 and Collier and Vicente, 2012). A study on social favours and the 
terms of commercial loans in Thailand can be found in Charumilind, Kali and Wiwatankantang (2006). Evidence of 
favoritism in medical school admissions in the US is also studied by Lentz and Laband (1989).  Bertrand et al. 
(2008) and Kramarz and Thesmar (2008) present empirical evidences on the exchange of favours among politicians, 
civil servants and corporate executives in France.  
 
3 This is accounted due to the presence of utility that people enjoy from identifying herself as a member of the 
group. It may also be psychologically meaningful to view people according to their race, culture, gender or religion. 
Quite often it is also observed that the people are clubbed in a group due to their link with an influential network 
(see Pérez-González (2006), Kramarz and Skans (2007), Bennedsen et al. (2007), Bandiera et al. (2009))or their 
association with big brand names as well. 
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referred as in-group favouritism. Tajfel et al., 1971, Turner et al., 1979, Bramoullé and Goyal, 
2009 and Breuer et al., 2011 also assert that favouritism is relatively easier to sustain in smaller 
groups within an organization. Our paper also contributes to the positive view of favouritism as it 
intends to explain the economic rational of individuals in choosing the preferred person over the 
deserving one, sometimes in spite of knowing that it leads to inefficiency. 
There are a few experimental research works exhibiting the existence of favouritism in 
different economic situations. Goeree et al. (2010) find that offers in a dictator game among 
teenagers are mainly driven by social distance between the dictator and receiver. Similar results 
are found for college students by Mobius et al. (2004) and Branas-Garza et al. (2006). Through a 
field experiment Bandiera et al. (2009) have shown that preferential treatment of friends is 
prevelant by managers towards workers in a fruit picking firm. Belot and Ven (2011) show the 
evidence of favouritism in an experimental set up with school children. This paper contributes to 
the existing literature by focussing on favouritism in the job market through a controlled 
laboratory experiment. 
Though this paper essentially identifies the reasons for choosing favouritism over 
fairness, alongside we try to understand a situational phenomena, defined as ‘random 
favouritism’4  When the principal adopts a relatively fair assessment rule (and/or to reduce search 
cost), she selects an agent randomly from her peer group of agents, which we define as random 
favouritism. This paper intends to provide the underlying micro- economic foundation behind the 
decision of preferring an agent randomly out of the homogenous ‘yet favoured’ pool of agents 
even when they have the option of offering the job to their preferred person (referred to as direct 
favouritism). Further, to motivate the concept of ‘random favouritism’ we can cite a close 
example. Suppose that head of the human resource department of an MNC is an alumnus of an 
educational institution ‘X’ (say). It is often observed that to increase the brand value of her own 
institution, which (indirectly) increases her own value
5
, students are recruited from the campus 
of institution ‘X’ (which is her favoured group, in this example). It is also observed that though 
the students are made to go through a very nominal screening, they are recruited almost 
                                                          
4
 see Dey and Banerjee (2013) 
5
 This may invite the recruiter with the opportunity of associating with academic as well as non- academic activities 
of the institution (say, invitation for a special lecture, chairing a session at a conference, holding an important 
position in the alumni association, etc.) and hence generating a feeling of ‘warm glow’.  
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randomly; the assumption here being that the ability of students is identical, as they come from 
the same institute (favoured group). This can be referred to as ‘random favouritism’. 
We lay down the basic objectives of this paper in three parts. First, we try to analyse the 
human response towards favouritism under three different situations: i. natural inclination, ii. 
when linked with own incentives, iii. when there is complete information regarding the 
competence of the chosen person. Specifically, we try to find out the existence of three specific 
(sometimes overlapping) behaviour of human nature, viz.; fairness, random favouritism and 
favouritism. Secondly, we also analyze how instrumental is the role of favoured group size and 
perceived valuation for social status in influencing the decision of subjects towards favouritism. 
Finally, we study the socioeconomic factors that determine the emergence of favouritism. Our 
paper suggests that there exist substantial evidence (41.67 % to 71.66 % depending on the 
treatment) of people being inclined towards favouritism in their final decision in our control 
experiment. Together with that we find that there is significant existence of random favouritism 
(10% to 48.33% depending on the treatment) even when the subjects had an option of exercising 
direct form of favouritism. Also, the experiment predicts that larger is the group size higher will 
be the favouritism which contradicts the predictions in the existing literature on favouritism and 
group size
6
. We find that subjects’ choice of random favouritism increase with the increase in 
favoured group size. The socioeconomic factors behind the existence of favouritism such as 
family structure, family occupation and social connections (both virtual and otherwise),caste, 
political connection play  a significant role in determining the optimal decision on favouritism.   
The present paper is organized as follows. The experimental design is described in section 2. 
Section 3 explains the analysis of experimental result in a discussion. The concluding remarks 
and possible future works are presented in section 4.  
  
2.  The Experiment 
2.1 Design 
 
The experiment has been conducted in Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India. In the experiment, 
for each session, students from the same class (stream) were asked to come to participate in the 
                                                          
6
 see Tajfel et al. (1971), Turner et al. (1979)). Bramoullé and Goyal (2009) and Breuer et al. (2011) 
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game together so that all the subjects in a session knew each other well. Each session had twenty 
subjects and there were twelve sessions. Each experimental session took approximately 40 
minutes.  
The prime objective of the experiment was to understand subjects’ inclination towards 
favouritism and the factors determining it. Therefore, in the experimental design we needed to 
ensure that the subjects know each other at a personal level, so that if they choose favouritism 
they actually know whom she is favouring. The subjects were asked to take decisions in stages, 
each stage reflecting a different situation. For all the decisions taken in this part of the game, 
payments were made. Since, the game involved revealing decisions on fairness versus different 
kinds of favouritism we had to ensure that the identity of the subjects is not disclosed. Thus, to 
maintain anonymity, the subjects were requested to pick a token from an urn which consisted of 
tokens numbering 1 to 20, at the very beginning of the second part of the experiment. They were 
asked to write their names and corresponding token numbers on a board and all the subjects were 
instructed to make a note of the same on a piece of paper and keep it with themselves. After that 
one of the subjects were requested to wipe off the board. All these activities took place without 
the presence of the experimenter inside the room. This ensured complete non-disclosure of their 
true identity throughout the experiment. The subjects were informed that the token numbers were 
their identity for the rest of the game. 
Next, all the subjects were instructed to write their token number and then define a group 
of three (or six, depending on the treatment)  close friends out of the twenty subjects in a piece of 
paper, with a carbon copy
7
, provided by the experimenter. Also, the subjects were asked to rank 
their friends from the defined group on the basis of their degree of personal association. The 
carbon copy of the paper was collected in an envelope.  
Now, they were informed that, each of the subjects would be designated as a principal 
(recruiter) whose job would be to select one subject  from the rest of the nineteen subjects, who 
acts as  agents (potential job applicants) in the game.  In this experiment, all the subjects 
performed as the principal at a single time point.  
They were also informed that the principal can choose a person from the rest of the 
nineteen subjects in the following three ways: a) choose the most efficient one out of the 
nineteen subjects (efficiency would be measured through a game, which would be explained 
                                                          
7
 This prevented the subjects from changing their decision, when the game unfolded. 
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below) or, b) choose any one randomly from her own group or, c) select the most preferred agent 
from the group (the friend who is ranked first in the group). They were assured that their decision 
choice would not be disclosed at any level of the game and hence were asked to reveal their 
decision.  The reasons behind their decision were also specified by the subjects from the list of 
reasons given out in a piece of paper. For taking this decision they were paid a flat payment of 
Rs.50.  This decision helped in understanding the subjects’ behavioural nature and also their 
inclination towards favouritism as it is not influenced by any extrinsic incentives. 
Now, the payment structure corresponding to the three different ways of selection were 
explained to the subjects, which are laid down as follows: 
a) For choosing the most efficient one out of the nineteen subjects:  
For this decision choice the subjects will secure their respective efficient payment (which 
they will generate from the game that will be explained later) which is termed as score 
payment in the rest of the paper. The efficiency score helped the subjects in securing a 
position/ rank among all the subjects participating in each session. Therefore, an equivalent 
payment is also given as social status.  Since the subjects are taking the most efficient and 
unbiased decision the experimenter provided her with an additional payment of 0.5× score 
payment as a premium for honestly. 
b) For choosing any one randomly from their respective group: 
For choosing someone randomly the subjects were asked to transfer a portion (ϵ[0,1])from 
their score earning to the randomly chosen person from her group. The experimenter would 
make that transferred payment twice ( 2 ×   × score payment) . A portion of this 
amount (λ ϵ[0,1]) could be returned back to the principal from that randomly chosen person. 
Since the principal is involved in a form of favouritism, therefore she loses a portion of her 
social status. Here we consider that loss to be of the fixed amount of 30%.    
c) For selecting the most preferred agent from the group (the friend who is ranked first in the 
group): 
For choosing the most preferred one the subjects were asked to transfer a portion 
( ϵ[0,1]) from their score earning to the most preferred person from her group. The 
experimenter made that transferred amount thrice (3 ×   × score payment). A portion of 
this amount  (λ ϵ[0,1])  could be returned back to the principal from that most preferred 
person. Since the principal is involved in a direct form of favouritism, therefore she suffers 
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from a proportionate loss of her social status. We measure the degree of unfair practice by 
Highest score−score of the most preferred person
Highest score
. Higher value of this ratio indicates that the 
chosen person is more undeserving. Thus, the principal’s social status was affected 
proportionately with this degree of unfair practice. Hence, by choosing a more undeserving 
person the principal deflated her social status more.  
They were also asked to mention the amount of their earnings that they would like to 
share, if they prefer someone randomly or select the most preferred subject in a group.. At 
the same time, they were asked to reveal the amount they expect to get back for both the 
decision choices. 
Given this situation the subjects are requested to reveal their decision. It is assured that 
the decision of the principal will not be disclosed. The principal was expected to specify the 
reason behind her choice of selection, from the reasons given in the paper. 
After completing the role of principal, the subjects were asked to play the role of agents. 
As agents, all the subjects were asked to answer a set of ten questions in 2 minutes. Then the 
payoff structure of agents (details in section 2.2) was also declared. Their payment was made 
according to the number of correct answers given by them. For each correct answer they 
were paid Rs. 10. While their efficiency scores were computed, the subjects were asked to 
imagine themselves as the favoured person of one of the principals. Then each subject was 
requested to write the amount of money she would like to return to the principal, if she is 
chosen directly or randomly. The subjects were also asked to complete a small questionnaire 
to understand their socio-economicfactors. Once the scores were generated it was displayed 
on the board corresponding to their token numbers. 
Now again, the role of the subjects were reversed. They were instructed to act in the role 
of principal once more and mention in a new piece of paper, whether she would stick to or 
change her initial decision of the selection.  If they decide to alter their decision then they 
were requested to identify the reasons behind their action, from the specified set of reasons 
given in the paper. At the end of the game the payment of the subjects was computed and 
paid out corresponding to their token number.  
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2. 2  Payoff: 
In this experiment all the subjects perform two roles: as a principal as well as an agent. For 
taking the initial decision choice the principal is offered a flat payment of Rs. 50.   
Thereafter, the payoff structure of the principal and the agent is different. The score of the 
game determines the level of efficiency of the subjects. All the subjects were offered a 
payment according to the efficiency score and decisions taken by her as well as her chosen 
friend. The efficiency is measured by the number of correct answers in the quiz. The 
payment accruing from the efficiency game is   Rs. 10 for every correct answer. This part of 
her income is her score payment. Her level of efficiency generates a sense of social status in 
her. Therefore, together with this score payment, an equal amount of money (depending on 
treatment) was given out to the subjects as social status. The subjects were also offered 
payment for taking decision as a principal. The principal’s payment structure corresponding 
to the three different ways of selection are as follows: 
(a) For choosing the most efficient person out of the nineteen subjects:  
Payoff = Score payment + social status + premium for being an efficient decision maker 
(=0.5× score payment). 
(b) For choosing any one randomly from own group: 
Payoff = (1 − ) × Score payment +  λ ×  ( 2 ×   × score payment) 
                                 −  30% of social status.  
(c) For selecting the most preferred agent from the group (the friend who is ranked first 
in the group). 
Payoff = (1 − ) × Score payment +  λ ×  ( 3 ×   × score payment) 
                                 −  (
Highest score−score of the most preferred person
Highest score
× 100) ×  social status.  
This is the earning that the subjects can earn as a principal.  The agent’s payment structure 
corresponding to the three different ways of selection were as follows: 
(1) For being chosen as  the most efficient one out of the nineteen subjects:  
                 Payoff = Score payment  
(2) For being chosen randomly from own group: 
Payoff =  × Score payment + (1 −  λ)  ×  ( 2 ×   × score payment) 
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(3) For being chosen as the most preferred agent from the group (the friend who is 
ranked first in the group). 
             Payoff =  × Score payment + (1 −  λ)  ×  ( 3 ×   × score payment). 
The table below provides the total payment structure for all possible combination of outcome. 
Table 1: Payoff Structure 
Role of the 
subject 
Fixed payment 
Decision Choice 
Most efficient 
one 
Any one 
randomly 
Most preferred 
one 
Principal  
50 
(a) (b) (c) 
Agent (1) (2) (3) 
 
 
2.3 Treatment: 
In this paper we intend to investigate human response on favouritism under different situations. 
For that, we consider two main arguments: change in social status and change in group size. We 
find in the existing literature that the group size plays a pivotal role in understanding favouritism. 
It has been identified that larger the group size more difficult it is to sustain favouritism 
(Bramoullé and Goyal, 2009 and Breuer et al., 2011). To investigate this in our experimental set-
up we incorporate group –size as a treatment.  To analyse how the principal’s decision on 
favouritism is affected with respect to change in group size, we consider two group sizes viz. a) 
group of 3 close friends, b) group of 6 close friends. It is widely studied in psychology, for 
instance, Pinel (1999), Crocker and Major(1989) among others establishing that people are 
conscious about how society perceives one’s own character.  When the valuation of a person’s 
own social status is high then one might want to secure it more or may be reluctant to lose a part 
of it.  To analyze this human behaviour we introduced the change in social status of the subjects 
as a treatment in the experimental design. We consider two levels of social status, which is 
generated as follows: a) by taking subjects’ individual score payment, b) by taking half of the 
subjects’ individual score payment. 
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Thus, across the sessions there were two treatments. Details of the treatments are as 
follows: 
 
Table 2: Treatment 
Treatment. 
no. 
Session 
Treatment Across Sessions 
Group Size Social Status 
1 1-3 3 0.5 
2 4-6 3 1 
3 7-9 6 0.5 
4 10-12 6 1 
 
3. Results and Discussion:  
3.1 Existence of Favouritism: 
Table 3 provides summary statistics regarding the sample distribution across treatments 
regarding the decisions made by the subjects. It shows the treatment wise decisions taken, in 
percentage. In the experiment 240 subjects had participated, out of which 125(52%) were male 
and rest (48%) were female and all were within the age group of 18-22 years. In the table below, 
decision 1 represents the natural inclination of the subjects towards choosing their best strategy 
to recruit an agent. Decision 2 was made after linking the payoff of the subjects with their 
decision, hence indicating a decision which is incentive- driven.  The final decision was made 
after revelation of the individual efficiency score. Therefore, decision 3 represented the choice of 
action taken under complete information.  Thus, in each session there had been injection of 
information in two stages, which are the treatments within the session. The changes in valuation 
of status and group size are the treatments which are the being captured across different sessions.  
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Table 3: Effect of treatment 
Decision Preference 
Treatment_1 
Gr Size=3 
SS=0.5 
Treatment_2 
Gr Size=3 
SS=1 
Treatment_3 
Gr Size=6 
SS=0.5 
Treatment_4 
Gr Size=6 
SS=1 
Decision_1 
Efficient 51.67 38.33 58.33 41.67 
Random 11.67 8.33 23.33 28.33 
Most Preferred 36.67 53.33 18.33 30.00 
Decision_2 
Efficient 75.00 31.67 51.67 40.00 
Random 5.00 13.33 25.00 26.67 
Most Preferred 20.00 55.00 23.33 33.33 
Decision_3 
Efficient 58.33 35.00 28.33 40.00 
Random 10.00 16.67 48.33 28.33 
Most Preferred 31.67 48.33 23.33 31.67 
 
From table 3 we can show that on an average 53.9% subjects would choose some form of 
favouritism over ‘efficient’ decision choice, considering all the twelve sessions. We can also 
observe that percentage of ‘efficient’ decisions falls, whereas percentage of “most preferred’ 
decisions rise for treatment 2 as compared with treatment 1.So, when the group  size is small and 
valuation of status is high, then individuals are ready to forego a part of their status to select a 
person of her choice. One more interesting situation emerges from this table: when the size of the 
favoured group is large and valuation of status is low (treatment 3) then random favouritism 
(48.33%) rules over all other decision choices. As the group size increases, it becomes difficult/ 
costly for the subject to evaluate the performance of each one from the group and she might risk 
more considering the future dynamics of their relationship (both within and outside the 
experiment). Moreover, as the valuation of status is already low, therefore the penalty of losing 
status does not restrict individuals from preferring one from the group randomly. 
3.2 Effect of Group Size and Social Status: 
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We also intend to look into the effect of the injection of the two ‘within session’ treatments. Put 
differently, we try to identify whether there is any significant change in the choice of action 
taken by the subjects which is being induced due to a) linking their payoffs with their decision 
and/or b) providing complete information. We perform Wilcoxon signed rank test
8
 to determine 
the decisions made at different levels of the experimental session are significantly different or 
not.  
Table 4: Effect of within session treatment 
Test Decision_1 and Decision_2 Decision_2 and Decision_3 
Wilcoxon 
Indication 
X * 
***/**/* denotes significance difference at 1/5/10 percent level.  X indicates no significant change in 
decision 
Table 4 shows that the change from Decision 1 to Decision 2 is not significantly different, 
indicating that the decision taken by the subjects is more intrinsically driven. Hence, the effect of 
incentivizing (linking decisions with money payment) does not affect the decision choice 
significantly. However, we observe the change in decision choice from Decision 2 to 3 is 
significant at 10% level of significance, indicating that the information about the true 
performance of the subjects influences the decision choice of the individuals. 
We can also analyze whether the change in group size or status bring about a significant 
change in the decision taken by the subjects or not. To identify the effect of change in group size 
on the change in decisions, we have to control for change in status, which can be ensured by 
comparing the changes between treatment 1 and 3 and then by comparing between treatment 2 
and 4. By controlling for the change in status, we find that the change in decision choice across 
the sessions is significantly affected by change in group size (see table 5). When the group size is 
small (=3) then due to change in valuation of status, the change in decision is significant, 
however, with the increase in group size, the change is status value does not have any significant 
effect on the change in decision choice, which helps to conclude that group effect is more strong 
than effect of status. 
                                                          
8
 The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a non-parametric statistical hypothesis test used for comparing two related 
samples or repeated measurements on a single sample to assess whether their population mean ranks differ. In other 
words it is a form of paired difference test. It can be used as an alternative to the paired Student's t-test, t-test for 
dependent samples when the population cannot be assumed to be normally distributed. 
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Table 5: Effect of treatment across sessions 
  
Change in 
Decision_1 
Change in 
Decision_2 
Change in 
Decision_3 
Group Effect 
T_1 and T_3 * ** * 
T_2 and T_4 * * * 
SS Effect 
T_1 and T_2 * *** *** 
T_3 and T_4 ** X X 
***/**/* denotes significance difference at 1/5/10 percent level.  X indicates no significant change in 
decision 
3.3: Socio Economic Factor behind Favoritism: 
Table 5, gives us the factors influencing the decision taking. To analyze the factors determining 
the decision taking, we perform logit regression on the following regression equations 
𝐷𝑖 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆 + 𝛽2𝐹 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑏 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑜 + 𝛽5𝐶 + 𝛽6𝑅 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑙 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑏 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑙 + 𝛽10𝑃ℎ+𝛽11𝑅𝑒𝑠 +
𝛽12𝐺 + 𝛽13𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐸𝑥𝑝 𝑅 + 𝜖                                                                                                    (1) 
where, 𝑖 = 1,2,3. 
Here, the dependent variable is transformed into a binary variable, where 𝐷𝑖 = 1, indicates that 
the decision involves favouritism (may be random or direct, clubbed together), and 𝐷𝑖 = 0 
indicates fair decision. Among the independent variables Sex (S), Family Structure (F) , Family 
Occupation (Fo),Cast (C), Religion (R), Political connection (Pol), Residence (Res),Group 
Size(G) and Status( St) are binary variable. Sibling (Sb), Social media (Fb) and Expected return 
(Exp) are non-binary variables. 
Though we have run the logit regression over the decisions taken over 3 different stages, 
however from the perspective of analysis, the factors influencing the final decision, i.e., decision 
3 carries more relevance. Thus, the explanation would mostly highlight decision 3. Since, it is a 
logit regression the values given within the cell of the table indicates the marginal value, the 
coefficient value is given within the parentheses for each cell. 
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We find that gender is significant (at 1%), indicating that male are more porn to indulge 
in favouritism. However when we consider the subjects’ intrinsic behavioural response then we 
observe that gender does not play any significant role. Family structure and family occupation 
also stands out as significant determining variables, when we consider decision 2 and 3, 
reflecting that if subjects belong to a joint family then they tend to deviate more from fairness. 
The occupational structure of family show negative significance, implying that if the subject 
belonged from a business family then they exhibit their preference more. In line with the studies 
like Karla and Pandey(2004) our paper re-enforces that caste play a significantly vital role in 
favouritism. Community feeling leading to in-group favouritism plays a pivotal role amongst 
minority/ SC/ST/OBC community. Yet again, the finding of the paper asserts the fact that 
political connection does significantly motivate in taking inefficient decisions. Interestingly, we 
also find that more the subjects are socially connected both through virtual (number of friends in 
Facebook and monthly phone bill) and real space (membership with Clubs and NGOs) more we 
find in-group favouritism. The treatment induced in the experiment, viz. group size, features as a 
significant determinant of favouritsm. Thus, when the group size increases as compared to the 
population size (which is 20 per session), then it strengthens the group feeling and favouritism 
emergence as an outcome. However the change in status does not affect the final decision taking 
significantly indicating that: the subjects who intend to involve in favouritism do not care about 
their loss of face. 
Table 4: Factors influencing the decision choice 
Independent Variable 
Decision_1 
(Preference=1, 
Efficient=0) 
Decision_2 
(Preference=1, 
Efficient=0) 
Decision_3 
(Preference=1, 
Efficient=0) 
Sex (M=1,F=0) 
0.0552 
(0.0789) 
0.2100*** 
(0.0789) 
0.2271*** 
(0.0754) 
Family Structure 
(Joint=1,Nuclear=0) 
0.0367 
(0.0859) 
0.2034** 
(0.0870) 
0.1627** 
(0.0785) 
Sibling 
0.0057 
(0.0381) 
0.0316 
(0.0415) 
0.0080 
(0.0394) 
Family Occupation 
(job=1,business=0) 
-0.0051 
(0.0859) 
-0.1901** 
(0.0858) 
-0.1500* 
(0.0801) 
Residence 
(PG/hostel/mess=1,home=0) 
-0.1426* 
(0.0778) 
0.0975 
(0.0823) 
0.0485 
(0.0778) 
Cast 
(General=1,Otherwise=0) 
-0.2263** 
(0.0949) 
-0.2431** 
(0.1042) 
-0.1717** 
(0.0892) 
Religion 0.2700** 0.0714 0.1901 
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Standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent level 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
Favouritism is a persistent problem within organizations and elsewhere
9
. The existence and 
prevalence of favouritism in spite of its undesirable consequences draws attention for the 
exploration of its origin. Alternately, the emerging literature on positive view of favouritism
10
 
tries to explain the reason for existence of favouritism and finds that directly favouring an agent 
over others (more deserving ones) can actually evolve as an optimal decision to the manager. 
This paper also contributes to this positive view of favouritism by explaining the underlying 
reasons behind choosing the preferred one over the deserving one in spite of knowing that it may 
lead to inefficiency. 
Due to the practical difficulty of gathering information on an individual’s performance 
together with their social link-ups, there are hardly any empirical evidence on favouritism. 
Though there exits experimental studies on favouritism, there are not enough studies regarding 
job market favouritism. In this paper, we resort to a laboratory experiment, which was conducted 
                                                          
9 See Kaufmann 2004, Khatri et al. 2006; Tanzi 1995, Comerford (2002), Albright and Carr (1997) among others. 
10
 Belot and van de Ven, 2011, Prendergast and Topel (1996), Kwon (2006), (Chen, 2010). 
(Hindu=1, Non-hindu=0) (0.1076) (0.1324) (0.1309) 
Political Connection 
(Yes=1,No=0) 
0.2830*** 
(0.0826) 
0.2662*** 
(0.0940) 
0.2104** 
(0.0853) 
Virtual Social Network 
0.0007*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
0.0009*** 
(0.0003) 
Club/NGO member 
(Yes=1,No=0) 
0.1264* 
(0.0747) 
0.0902 
(0.0820) 
0.1713** 
(0.0742) 
Phone Expenditure 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
Group Size 
(size 6=1, size3=0) 
-0.0306 
(0.0806) 
0.0352 
(0.0892) 
0.2183*** 
(0.0808) 
Status 
(Status 1=1,Status .5=0) 
0.1038 
(0.0763) 
0.2018*** 
(0.0801) 
-0.0898 
(0.0784) 
Expected Return 
0.0026 
(0.0022) 
0.0031 
(0.0024) 
-0.0022 
(0.0022) 
Chi
2 
48.67 87.71 87.32 
Pseudo R
2 
0.1465 0.2636 0.2696 
N 240 240 240 
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among the students of Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India, to imitate the real job market 
situation. They were put into a situation where they had the power of offering a job to someone 
in his/her company, where they were asked to express their choice on the basis of their personal 
preference or otherwise. Put differently, this paper contributes to the existing literature by 
focussing on favouritism in job market through a controlled laboratory experiment to suggest 
that there exist substantial evidence (41.67 % to 71.66 % depending on the treatment) of people 
being inclined towards favouritism. Though this paper broadly focuses on understanding the 
reasons for choosing favouritism over fairness, we also try to specifically study the rationality 
behind prevalence of ‘random favouritism’.11  By random favouritism we mean a situation when 
the principal selects an agent randomly from her peer group of agents. It is shown that there is 
significant existence of random favouritism (10% to 48.33% depending on the treatment) even 
when the subjects had an option of choosing the direct form of favouritism. We also find that 
with the increase in favoured group size subjects’ choice for random favouritism increases12. The 
paper throws some light in analyzing the socioeconomic factors which may drive the existence of 
favouritism. It suggests that factors like family structure, family occupation and social 
connections (both virtual and otherwise), caste, political connection play a significant role in 
determining the optimal decision of favouritism.  
Generally, an individual involved in practicing favouritism expects something in return 
from the favoured one. However, expectation may not often be explicit and the favoured one 
may not return even the due gratitude (which one often expects) in future. Therefore, it indicates 
that favouritism emerges on the basis of some expected returns. Thus we analyze what factors 
determine the expectation formation for the degree of return from the favoured person, which 
motivate the optimal decision on favouritism. These are a few issues which are intended to be 
addressed in the future. 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 see Dey and Banerjee (2013) 
12
  Tajfel et al. (1971), Turner et al. (1979). Bramoullé and Goyal (2009) and Breuer et al. (2011) suggest that it is 
easier to involve in favouritism within a small group size. 
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